Despite some advantages over traditional (offline) labor markets - such as lower search costs, better matching and improved monitoring - online labor markets (OLMs) have not taken off as initially expected. In this paper, we study the factors that limit perceived project success on OLMs. Using...

This paper studies the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets (e.g. the market for gastroenterology fellowships and the market for judicial clerks) in the presence of social networks. We offer a two-stage model in which workers in training institutions reveal information on...

We model a competitive labor market with heterogeneous firms of varying productivities, and consider two information-collection processes: searching for "good news" about applicants, and searching for "bad news." Under the former, firms seek positive signals to qualify applicants, and under the...

We study the consequences of job markets' heavy reliance on referrals. Referrals screen candidates and lead to better matches and increased productivity, but disadvantage job-seekers who have few or no connections to employed workers, leading to increased inequality. Coupled with homophily,...

The majority of labor transactions throughout much of history and a significant fraction of such transactions in many developing countries today are “coercive,” in the sense that force or the threat of force plays a central role in convincing workers to accept employment or its terms. We...

This research presents a new metric known as "AI Augmentation," aimed at quantifying the influence of generative AI across diverse job roles, organizations, and sectors. The analysis defies prevailing expectations of job losses due to AI, instead demonstrating a reverse correlation between AI...

Whistle-blowers frequently face retaliation after reporting law-breaking activities and end up leaving their employing organization. Our study uses a controlled lab experiment to examine how whistle-blowing affects the chances of future employment when respective employees re-enter the labor...

We look at the economic functions of firms, contracts, and markets and characterize the optimal scope of the firm. Governance structures appear as equilibria and are compared in terms of production costs - determined by a tradeoff between standardization and adaptation - and adjustment costs -...

We look at the economic functions of firms, contracts, and markets and characterize the optimal scope of the firm. Governance structures appear as equilibria and are compared in terms of production costs - determined by a tradeoff between standardization and adaptation - and adjustment costs –...