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Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657183
On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.
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Large, international banking groups have sought to centralise their cross-currency liquidity management: liquidity … shortages in one currency are financed using liquidity surpluses in another currency. The nature of risks to financial stability … emerging from global liquidity management depends on how these foreign exchange transactions settle. I analyse these risks in a …
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is the liquidity management of these banks, specifically the regular flow of funds between parent banks and their … transmission. -- bank ; global ; liquidity ; transmission ; capital markets ; crisis ; contagion …
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We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888114
We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003464116
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both...
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