We examine the hold-up problem of price regulation and compare it with the monetary policy credibility problem. For …-up problem in regulation turns out to be more serious than the inflation bias problem in monetary policy. Even with far … increases slowly. These results make the Rogoff-delegation solution to the regulatory commitment problem especially attractive …

from the need to achieve credibility and a reputation for economically sound long-run behaviour while preserving …

It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the … that delegation enables a wider class of economies to sustain zero inflation than would be able to do so in its absence. We …

A time-inconsistency problem in regulation often results in under-investment es- pecially where there are high sunk … this ‘hold-up’ problem facing the price regulation of a firm with market power where full commitment to a price regime is … not possible. We compare a political equilibrium based on a voting model with lobbying with a delegation equilibrium …

premature to conclude that 'Too Big to Fail" has been solved, but macro-prudential regulation is now much more effective and …

Following the 2008 financial crisis, countercyclical regulation emerged as one of the most promising breakthroughs in … years to halting destructive cycles of booms and busts. This new approach to systemic risk posits that financial regulation … and to prick asset bubbles before they burst. If countercyclical regulation is to succeed, however, then policymakers must …