Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models' definitions of substitutability to settings in which...

A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always...

This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I...

Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity....

This appendix to "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms" (available at 'https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120463' https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120463) contains a proof of the sufficiency result (Theorem 4) in Section 3 and all proofs for Section 4

We characterize when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions---observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms---and show that when these...