Empirical evidence on Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) is scarce. This paper contributes to the RPM debate by providing novel empirical evidence based on a unique database of RPM complaints, lodged in the UK to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) between 2007 and 2009. The aim of the paper is...

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only...

We analyze vertical relationships between a manufacturer and competing retailers when consumers have reference-dependent preferences. Consumers adopt the manufacturer’s suggested retail price as their reference price and perceive losses when purchasing above the suggested price and gains when...

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer’s contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by...

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer's contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by...

We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer then maximizes her profit through min RPM...

We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a substitute good and/or the effort the retailer exerts...

In this chapter, we begin our discussion of antitrust economics by considering what many consider its most central element: its ban on "price fixing" - that is, agreements among competitors over the prices they will charge or the outputs they will produce. Indeed, the prohibition on price fixing...