mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the … analysis of contracts under risk, where separation is often feasible. …. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face uncertainty: they do not know the payoff-relevant probability. Alice offers …

mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the … analysis of contracts under risk, where separation is often feasible. …. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face uncertainty: they do not know the payoff-relevant probability. Alice offers …

seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance … over a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that maximizes the minimum payoff over … contract for any given probability distribution is a posted price, which induces bunching. Using the e-contamination model …

the uncertainty regarding preference heterogeneity among experts. I show that its effect on the emergence of populism is … different depending on the type of the uncertainty. In particular, an increase in risk and in ambiguity (i.e., Knightian … uncertainty) work in opposite directions with higher ambiguity rather than risk being a significant source of populism. This …

' private information about risk tolerance, offer a sensible way to approach the problem. These contracts are generally a … likely to differ in their tolerance for risk. In this paper, I investigate a contracting scheme designed to mitigate the … asymmetric information problem where agents are heterogeneous in their tolerance for risk. Mechanisms that recognize the …

explanation: that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. To … explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal … financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large …

principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides … the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …

cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … contract is misspecified, i.e., when he is offered the robust contract, but his true effort cost is constant. I find that … organizations, most notably risk-shifting and the quiet life …

towards ambiguity. I characterize the sequence of short term contracts between the ambiguity averse commercial firm and … ambiguity neutral research lab, and examine how the special features of the optimal contract facilitates ambiguity sharing. I …