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Delegating Performance Evaluation
Letina, Igor - 2018
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932366
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Delegating performance evaluation
Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 477-509
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308439
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Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback
Zabojnik, Jan - 2014
Firms use subjective performance evaluations to provide employees with both incentives and feedback. This article shows that if an objective measure of performance, however imperfect, is available, subjective evaluations with incentive effects can be sustained even without repeated interaction....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149806
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Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2014
schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation as well as the optimal design of the compensation scheme …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233989
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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010 - First Version: January 2002; Revised, February 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822070
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Objective versus subjective performance evaluations
Terstiege, Stefan - 2013
Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198959
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Delegation and dynamic incentives
Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2014
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347364
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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
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Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018
Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889
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Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2019
Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992961