We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes knowledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the latter susceptible to electioneering activities. A special interest group provides campaign financing in exchange for influence...

We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main...

We examine integration strategies of multinational firms that face a rich array of choices of international organization. Each firm in an industry must provide headquarter services from its home country, produce intermediate inputs, and assemble the intermediate goods into final products. Both...

We study the determinants of the location of sub-contracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of...

We study the determinants of the extent of outsourcing and of direct foreign investment in an industry in which producers need specialized components. Potential suppliers must make a relationship-specific investment in order to serve each prospective customer. Such investments are governed by...

Paul Romer (1986, 1990) ve Robert Lucas (1988)’in makaleleri bize; ölçeðe göre artan getirilerin mevcut olduðu bir ekonomik ortamda yatýrým gerçekleþtiðinde, sermayenin marjinal ürününün iskonto oranýna göre zamanla düþmesi gerekmediðini hatýrlatmýþtýr. Zira sermaye...

We develop a framework for studying trade in horizontally and vertically differentiated products. In our model, consumers with heterogeneous incomes and tastes purchase a homogeneous good and make a discrete choice of quality and variety of a differentiated product. The distribution of...

We develop a neoclassical trade model with heterogeneous factors of production. We consider a world with two factors, labor and .managers., each with a distribution of ability levels. Production combines a manager of some type with a group of workers. The output of a unit depends on the types of...

We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility, and we prove that the principals' Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public...

Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and non-cooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political...