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We derive conditions for when having a "busy" director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453824
We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders' interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825803
We derive conditions for when having a “busy” director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946482
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After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256079
We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799
We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by o¤ering acqui- sition opportunities to successful managers. This allows ?rms to reduce performance- based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493191
After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326302