Experiments compare bidding behavior of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry with that of student subjects in efforts to identify differences in behavior between "naive" and "expert" subjects. Qualitatively similar behavior is reported across subject pools as in...

An experiment analyzing behavior in English common value auctions is reported. English auctions raise more revenue than first-price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a strong winner's curse. Agents employ other bidders' dropout prices along with their private information as Nash...

In affiliated private value auctions, each bidder has perfect information regarding own value for the object at auction, but higher values of the item for one bid der make higher values for rivals more likely. The authors report on a series of experiments examining the following predictions: (1)...

We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding...

Signaling models are studied using experiments and adaptive learning models in an entry limit pricing game. Even though high cost monopolies never play dominated strategies, the easier it is for other players to recognize that these strategies are dominated, the more likely play is to converge...