Similar Search Results

Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games

Fishburns, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826788

How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835685

Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds

Brams, Steven J. - The MIT Press

Game theory models are ubiquitous in economics, common in political science, and increasingly used in psychology and … sociology; in evolutionary biology, they offer compelling explanations for competition in nature. But game theory has been only … worlds of literature, history, and philosophy. And yet, as Steven Brams shows, game theory can illuminate the rational …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008919682

A Generic Negotiation Game

Brams, Steven J. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992) 1, pp. 53-66

A generic Negotiation Game (NG) is used to model a conflict between two parties seeking to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. NG is a 2 × 2 non-constant-sum symmetric game that is `generic' in the sense that its payoffs, which are assumed to be cardinal, are only incompletely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166207

Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best

Brams, Steven J.; Samuel Merrill, III - In: Management Science 32 (1986) 10, pp. 1346-1355

A new procedure is proposed for settling disputes which combines binding arbitration (BA) and final-offer arbitration (FOA). Unlike either of the two pure procedures, combined arbitration (CA) induces the two parties to converge in making their final offers. Under BA, the arbitrator's settlement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191818

When is Size a Liability?

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 7 (1995) 3, pp. 301-316

Riker's `size principle' predicts that only minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) will form in n-person zero-sum games that satisfy certain conditions. After summarizing the logic of this principle, a model is proposed in which n players can be ordered from most to least weighty. Two different kinds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777910

Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible

Brams, Steven J. - The MIT Press

the mathematical theory of games to the Hebrew Bible. Brams's thesis is that God and the human biblical characters acted … precisely the manner in which they sought to achieve their goals. He relies almost exclusively on noncooperative theory, making … biblical studies, the philosophy of religion, political theory, and game theory and methodology. In the new chapter, Brams …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973268

Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Affuso, Paul J.; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611698

Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples

Brams, Steven J.; Mattli, Walter - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248342

SEQUENTIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURES

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Weber, Shlomo - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264449