substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …

responsibility (ECSR). We consider a mixed oligopoly under cross-ownership between the private firms and compare three cases of … find that private managers always undertake ECSR, whereas public managers do so when there is severe environmental damage …. We also find that the ECSR incentives for welfare-weighted public managers are always lower than for their profit …

no longer innocuous, because two firms can share unique shocks not shared by another, or all other firms, in an oligopoly …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …