This paper studies the impact of the possibility to enter a tournament as a team on the gender gap in tournament entry …. While a large and significant gender gap in entry in the individual tournament is found in line with the literature, no … gender gap is found in entry in the team tournament. While women do not choose to enter the tournament significantly more …

matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As … already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co … tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co-participant, increases women's willingness …

We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon relational modeling and uses …, the minimal covering set, the Banks set, and the tournament equilibrium set are delivered. We present an example of a … tournament on a small set of alternatives, for which the above choice sets are computed and visualized via RelView. The technique …

We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon a relational modeling and … set, the minimal covering set, the Banks set, and the tournament equilibrium set are delivered. We present an example of a … tournament on a small set of alternatives, for which the above choice sets are computed and visualized via RelView. The technique …

We describe a simple computing technique for the tournament choice problem. It rests upon relational modeling and uses …, the minimal covering set, the Banks set, and the tournament equilibrium set are delivered. We present an example of a … tournament on a small set of alternatives, for which the above choice sets are computed and visualized via RelView. The technique …

the production period, and continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament. We find …

show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payo¤ but that it is not …

tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real task. Men choose the tournament significantly more often than …

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects …