Showing 1 - 10 of 7,604
This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470424
managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471981
Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473055
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453649
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471944
Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay to performance incentives created by the revaluation of stock option holdings. The findings suggest that if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472136