Showing 1 - 10 of 16
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460980
contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002166534
In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001737652
In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper the authors give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts they show that such may increase efficiency. They show that efficiency can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001491110
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first develop a contractarian theory of redistribution. The existence of rules … in trade. The second purpose of the paper is to develop a theory of institutions that implement optimal allocations. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001557189
Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered, where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001440827
In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460996
Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of money by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001941360
This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual realizations of benefit and costs of the project, the second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001610809
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypthesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001566063