: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …

We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. The … demands across the firms. We first establish the existence of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (oligopoly equilibria … oligopoly equilibria of this game can be arbitrarily low. However, if the best oligopoly equilibrium is selected (among multiple …