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We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507904
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781544
evaluation is also justified in a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry. If input markets are competitive and output per … firm declines with the number of firms (business stealing), there is excessive entry into such oligopoly. If trade unions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024580
We study the gains from trade in a model with oligopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms and innovation, and provide a formula to decompose the mechanism. The new insight we provide is that market concentration can be a welfare-relevant feature of market power above and beyond markup...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507344
If an additional competitor reduces output per firm in a homogenous Cournot-oligopoly, market entry will be excessive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573222
We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507913
In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Economics Letters, 124: 122-126) show that in a vertically related market Cournot competition yields higher social welfare compared to Bertrand competition if the upstream firm subsidises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569602
We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781965
We assess the consequences for market quality and welfare of different entry regimes and exchange pricing policies in a context of limited market participation. To this end we integrate a two-period market microstructure model with an exchange competition model with entry in which exchanges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011954459
We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010484491