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Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002

In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas with contets. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539675

Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests

Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001666611

Let's collude

Aghadadashli, Hamid; Legros, Patrick - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012300998

Our product is unique : a note on a delegation game with differentiated products

Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021

substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219

Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition

Zhang, Zhentang - 2002

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436367

Management takeover battles and the role of the "golden handshake"

Fabel, Oliver; Kolmar, Martin - 2002

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491061