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Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474245

Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489460

Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001771977

Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types

Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presenting a general algorithm to find the pure -strategy equilibria of this game, we use it to characterize these equilibria when the two principals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624291

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460948

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460980

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361017

Setting incentives : temporary performance premiums versus promotion tournaments

Meier, Volker - 2001

tournament system induces a higher total output than the optimum premium system. This result occurs because a promotion regime …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014460967

EVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation

Larmande, François; Ponssard, Jean-Pierre - 2004

Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and … qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed. It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002257160

Strategic trade policy and the home bias in firm ownership structure

Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A. - 2003

firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001754908

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