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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994120
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010251468
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003991695
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Risk and the CEO market : why do some large firms hire highly-paid, low-talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003968996
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOS?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143463
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Bankers' pay structure and risk
Thanassoulis, John - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936233
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A theory of fair ceo pay
Chaigneau, Pierre; Edmans, Alex; Gottlieb, Daniel - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477768
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
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Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design : conference paper
Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2013
We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339385