political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation … institutional framework in the host country, the elite influences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of … expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization …

political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation … institutional framework in the host country, the elite in uences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of … expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization …

political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation … institutional framework in the host country, the elite influences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of … expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization …

resource production makes expropriation more attractive from the perspective of national governments. A low expropriation risk … estimations of a simultaneous equation model for 50 resource-rich countries in which we endogenize expropriation risk, corruption …

Foreign investment is often constrained by two forms of political risk: expropriation and corruption. We examine the … face the threat of expropriation. Using a novel dataset on worldwide expropriations of FDI over the 1990-2014 period, we … find a positive relationship between the extent of foreign investor protections and the likelihood of expropriation when a …