The behavior of a hedge-fund manager naturally depends on her compensation scheme, her preferences, and constraints on her risk-taking. We propose a numerical method which can be used to analyze the impact of these influences. The model leads to several interesting and novel results concerning...

This paper investigates dynamically optimal risk-taking by an expected-utility maximizing manager of a hedge fund. We examine the effects of variations on a compensation structure that includes a percentage management fee, a performance incentive for exceeding a specified highwater mark, and...

A hedge fund manager invests the fund in a constant investment opportunity, and receives high-water mark fees when the fund reaches a new maximum relative to a stochastic benchmark, aiming to maximize the expected power utility from fees in the long run. The manager's optimal portfolio includes...

This paper extends the Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) model to the case of partial information, where the expected return of a hedge fund is not observable but known to be either high or low. The fund manager can dynamically update his belief about the true value of the expected return...

I solve in closed form for the optimal dynamic risk choice of a fund manager who is compensated with a high-water mark contract. The optimal risk choice depends on the ratio of the fund's assets under management to its high-water mark. If the manager's outside option value is low, investors'...