from the classic Spence's model, the article shows how the introduction of inequalities in accessing to education leads to …

role of education on the allocation of talent in a two-sector model where education provides workers information about … their abilities, the equilibrium set expands to include equilibria where education serves as a signal. Signaling is …-efficient) induces the mediocre to educate, while the least and the most able skip education. When workers know more than firms about …

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only … unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling …

, by grading honestly, a school can build up reputation. Introducing a concern for reputation into an established signaling …

education. While men with low skills out-earn their higher-skilled counterparts when they are very young, their earnings are …

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on job market signalling and on education as a job market … importance of relative education as an explanatory variable in a Mincerian- style wage equation. I find the conclusions of this … method to be dependent on the reference group used in defining relative education. Consequently also the second method yields …

I extend Spence's (1973) signaling model by assuming some workers are overconfident - they underestimate their marginal … cost of acquiring education - and some are underconfident. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and beliefs … the gender pay gap. If education raises productivity, men are overconfident, and women underconfident, then women will, on …