This study investigates market reactions to announcements of CEO turnover and finds that forced turnovers are not accompanied by positive returns, which contradicts the broad view that firing a CEO sends a positive signal to the market. This contradiction is further explored by focusing on the...

Using 2,956 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, I find that default probability is useful in understanding and predicting forced CEO turnovers for non-distressed firms, controlling for conventional performance measures, such as stock performance. The high predictive power is not explained by...

This paper analyzes the relationship between CEO education, CEO turnover and firm performance. Our primary interest is on the role that CEO education plays in a firm's decision to replace its current CEO, the role that it plays in selecting a new CEO, and on whether CEO education significantly...

I study the influence of networks and connectedness on CEO labor market outcomes, including new CEO appointments, CEO termination, and CEO compensation. I distinguish between the pairwise specific CEO-board connectedness and the strength and structure of the CEO's overall connectedness. I find...

This paper presents a new model of CEO turnover that includes outside employment and retirement options. The board and the CEO use firm performance to update their beliefs about the CEO's ability. If the CEO's perceived ability falls below an endogenously determined threshold, the board fires...