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Liquidity and Governance
Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and … information concerns her own plans for taking an active role in governance. We show that an increase in the liquidity of the firm …'s stock increases the likelihood of the large investor ‘taking the Wall Street walk.’ Thus, higher liquidity is harmful for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717
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Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off
Gaspar, José-Miguel; Massa, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper investigates the impact of ownership patterns on the way the firm is monitored, on the liquidity of its … selection discount required by less informed investors to trade, reducing the firm’s liquidity. Both effects are properly … prices, but the lower liquidity induced by their presence tends to reduce prices. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497985
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The Wealthy Hand-to-Mouth
Kaplan, Greg; Violante, Giovanni L; Weidner, Justin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
The wealthy hand-to-mouth are households who hold little or no liquid wealth (cash, checking, and savings accounts), despite owning sizable amounts of illiquid assets (assets that carry a transaction cost, such as housing or retirement accounts). We use survey data on household portfolios for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084522
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Liquidity and Inefficient Investment
Hart, Oliver; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study the role of fiscal policy in a complete markets model where the only friction is the non-pledgeability of human capital. We show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient, leading to too little risky investment. We also show that fiscal policy following a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084716
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Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th century British Banks
Grossman, Richard; Imai, Masami - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals—that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145404
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Ambiguity, Disagreement, and Allocation of Control in Firms
Dicks, David L.; Fulghieri, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We present a novel source of disagreement grounded in decision theory: ambiguity aversion. We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm's insider and outside shareholders, creating a new rationale for corporate governance systems. In our paper, optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213312
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Delegated Activism and Disclosure
Dasgupta, Amil; Zachariadis, Konstantinos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321841
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Corporate Control and Executive Selection
Lippi, Francesco; Schivardi, Fabiano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We present a model in which the owner of the firm enjoys a private benefit from developing a personal relationship with the executives. This may lead the owner to retain a senior executive in office even though a more productive replacement is available. The model shows that the private returns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677237
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Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium
Parigi, Bruno; Pelizzon, Loriana; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165663
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The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084007