sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multispell …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. Based on a large inflow sample into unemployment …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics.We find that a vacancy referral increases the …

claiming unemployment insurance benefits. Then, we explore the effect of potential benefit duration on the transitions to … extend their benefit duration by up to 90 days. The maximum number of days of this 'passive sickness benefit' was halved in … duration was cut by 45 days. However, we find that job finding hazard on the week after benefit exhaustion increased more for …

sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We …Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However … estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that a vacancy referral increases …