The paper provides an account of innovative financing mechanisms which have been adopted in many national training systems. These mechanisms aim at correcting shortcomings of conventional training finance systems in order to better meet labor market needs, improve both the quality and relevance...

Workforce development in the US today is spread across higher education institutions (primarily public 2-year and for-profit colleges), labor market institutions and workplaces, with public funding from a range of sources. But outcomes for students and workers are weaker than they could be,...

European firms have increasingly invested in training of employees but differences across countries and types of firms remain and the Covid-19 shock may have exacerbated them. This report analyses European firms' investment in training over the last six years examining trends, factors supporting...

In what sense are institutions a deep determinant of growth? In this paper, we address this question by examining the relationship between city growth and institutional reform in 19th century Germany, when some cities experienced deep institutional reform as a result of French rule. Employing an...

Skills are a central source of high productivity and economic well-being. But what do we mean by productive skills? Both with regard to measurement and policy, the primary focus in the U.S. has been on academic skills, as measured by tests of reading, writing and math abilities and by...

Job training programs can be an eective policy for improving productivity and labor market outcomes in low and middle income countries. We report medium and long-term impacts of a job training program for vulnerable workers in Chile on labor market and skill outcomes using experimental and...

As work changes more quickly, firm-provided training may become more relevant. However, there is little causal evidence about the effects of training on firms. This paper studies a large training grants programme in Portugal, supported by the European Social Fund, contrasting firms that received...

We expand Acemoglu and Pischke's seminal model of training in imperfect labor markets by including the system of collective wage bargaining and the components of firms' training costs. Thus we can adapt their model to institutional changes that occurred since the 1990s. The model and the...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

We expand Acemoglu and Pischke's seminal model of training in imperfect labor markets by including the system of collective wage bargaining and the components of firms' training costs. Thus we can adapt their model to institutional changes that occurred since the 1990s. The model and the...