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Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract

Xue, Jin; Fei, Yiwen - In: China finance review international 6 (2016) 4, pp. 404-431

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011722900

Mathematical model used in substantiating optimal contract

Anghelache, Constantin; Marin, Dumitru; Grigorescu, … - In: Theoretical and applied economics : GAER review 27 (2020) 2/623, pp. 5-18

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Contracts for venture capital financing with double-sided moral hazard

Fu, Hui; Yang, Jun; An, Yunbi - In: Small business economics : an entrepreneurship journal 53 (2019) 1, pp. 129-144

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Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition

Choi, Jin Hyuk; Han, Kookyoung - In: Economics letters 195 (2020), pp. 1-4

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Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079