We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning...

The brief emphasises the need to translate climate commitments into effective policies, focusing on carbon pricing mechanisms like emissions trading, carbon taxes, and crediting mechanisms led by public authorities. - Carbon pricing cooperation is essential for increasing climate ambition,...

We analyze a two-stage coalition formation game in which the provision of the global public good is not only associated with variable costs but also with fixed costs. We consider the assumptions that signatories share or do not share fixed costs. We show that fixed costs may imply corner...

The Education for Climate Coalition is a flagship initiative of the European Education Area and the Green Deal hosted by the European Commission. As a community of practice, it enriches both the Council recommendation on learning for the green transition and sustainable development and the...

Countries increasingly form alliances to collectively impose sanctions. However, the resulting impact of such coordination remains unclear. Analyzing the 2014 wave of sanctions against Russia over 400,000 simulations with a quantitative trade model, this report demonstrates that multilateral...

In this paper, we explore the reproducibility of the König et al. (2022) paper on the timing of bill initiation under coalition governments and validate its scope condition by expanding the analysis to an additional government and country, namely the United Kingdom's Conservative-Liberal...

The increasing electoral success of populist radical-right parties poses a significant challenge to established political parties in Western democracies. While mainstream parties often maintain a policy of non-cooperation with these newcomers, such cordon sanitaire strategies can become...

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

Each value for TU-games satisfying efficiency, symmetric and linear is called an ESL value. We introduce a new value for TU-games with coalition structures, namely the Shapley-ESL value, which applies the Shapley value among coalitions and the ESL value within coalitions. Based on a new basis...

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to group deviations. We present notions of core consistent with such expectations and identify the largest and smallest cores. We restrict the domain of preferences to study the...

The need to insure against idiosyncratic income risk leads to the formation of risksharing groups in village economies where formal financial markets are absent. We develop a theoretical model to address the impact of limited commitment and social control on the extent of informal risk sharing...

Global value chains (GVCs) have connected firms in complex networks within and across national borders. However, political economy models often assume away production linkages and thus fail to explain pervasive and diverse trade coalitions cutting across industries and firms. I develop a...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition setups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanctions senders and target; (ii)...

In this inaugural report, we provide an update on the first nine months of CERCA’s activities. To raise awareness about CERCA’s vision, we outline theoretical frameworks and background research related to race modifiers in clinical algorithms, analytic approaches for prospective assessment...

The 2023 war between Hamas and Israel elicits many different explanations. As with previous regional hostilities, here too, the pundits and commentators have numerous overlapping processes to draw on - from the struggle between the Zionist and Palestinian national movements, to the deep...

Without regulation or agreement, public goods are underprovided and public bads are overprovided. Both problems are usually seen as flip sides of the same coin. In this paper we examine a situation where a public good is good for some agents but bad for others, and this preference is endogenous...