We study the effect of political regime change on higher education and its distributional and political consequences. We focus on the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile. The Pinochet dictatorship's aims of political control and fiscal conservatism led to a large reduction...

Autocrats often control social organizations to disseminate their ideology. We examine the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-1990), where conservative military forces controlled female social organizations to promote traditional roles for women as mothers and housewives. Partnering with...

We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...

This paper examines how network ties between local social leaders influenced the diffusion of mass protests in an autocracy. We focus on the Protestant Church and the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany. To quantify the role of leader networks in protest diffusion, we compile biographical...

This study explores the way in which social information about giving impacts the stability of distributional preferences. We designed a two-stage treatment which varied the information participants received about the maximum amounts given to recipients. Information on maximum giving can...

We study the effect of political regime change on higher education and its distributional and political consequences. We focus on the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile. The Pinochet dictatorship's aims of political control and fiscal conservatism led to a large reduction...

Autocrats often control social organizations to disseminate their ideology. We examine the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990), where conservative military forces controlled female social organizations to promote traditional roles for women as mothers and housewives. Partnering with...

We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by symmetry, ex-post...

Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and...

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people’s response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard...

An extensive literature documents that people are willing to sacrifice personal material gain to adhere to a moral motive. However, less is known about the psychological mechanisms that operate when two moral motives come into conflict. We hypothesize that individuals adhere to the moral motive...

We develop a dynamic model in which a group collectively bargains with an external party. At each date the group makes an offer to the external party (the 'agent') in exchange for a concession. Group members hold heterogeneous preferences over agreements and are uncertain about the agent's...

We provide new evidence on the causal effect of higher education on mortality. Our empirical strategy exploits the reduction in college openings introduced by the Pinochet regime after the 1973 coup in Chile, which led to a sharp downward kink in college enrollment among those cohorts reaching...

In this paper we examine the legacies on civil society of routine repressive activities carried out by authoritarian regimes, such as the targeting of opposition organizations. We focus on participation in voluntary associations in post-authoritarian Spain. We hypothesize that while repression...

Are ministers of finance more likely to keep their job if the economy is doing well? We argue that the answer depends on the regime type. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high performing ministers of finance since they can help them win elections. The incentive structure is less...

Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for...

Repression and information manipulation are two main tools of any modern authoritarian regime. Our theoretical model demonstrates how repression and propaganda complement each other: when the regime’s opponents are facing stricter punishment, the effect of persuasion is stronger, and...

Global public goods pose great risks, especially when the lack of these goods may have devastating consequences. Climate protection is such a good and it faces a triple dilemma: the so-called Westphalian dilemma of sovereign nation states, a weakest-link dilemma as the success of climate...

Gender differences have frequently been studied in experimental economics, but the findings remain inconclusive. In this study, we focus on gender differences in expectations and economic behavior in a dictator game, building on Blanckenburg, Iseke and Tebbe (2023). We add to prior work by...