We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...

Peer evaluation tournaments are common in academia, the arts, and corporate environments. They make use of the expert knowledge that academics or team members have in assessing their peers’ performance. However, rampant opportunities for cheating may throw a wrench in the process unless,...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction...

Peer evaluation tournaments are common in academia, the arts, and corporate environments. They make use of the expert knowledge that academics or team members have in assessing their peers' performance. However, rampant opportunities for cheating may throw a wrench in the process unless,...

We examine the effects of endogenous sequences on the fairness in round-robin tournaments with four players, multiple prizes, and general contest technologies. A tournament is called horizontally ex-ante fair if symmetric contestants have the same expected payoffs (odds) before the tournament...

We examine the effects of endogenous sequences on the fairness in round-robin tournaments with four players, multiple prizes, and general contest technologies. A tournament is called horizontally ex-ante fair if symmetric contestants have the same expected payoffs (odds) before the tournament...

We empirically test whether executives' increases in base salary when promoted to CEO result from the wage bids of competing firms (i.e., "market-based tournaments") or from the strategic choices of the firm's board of directors to elicit optimal executive incentives (i.e., "classic...

This paper specifies an extensive form as a 5-ary relation (i.e. set of quintuples) which satisfies certain abstract axioms. Each quintuple is understood to list a player, a situation (e.g. information set), a decision node, an action, and a successor node. Accordingly, the axioms are understood...

This paper investigates how exploited noise trading behavior is influenced by limited attention. As the daily price limit rules of the Chinese stock market provide a scenario for the exhibition of salient payoffs, speculators elevate prices to attract noise traders with salience preferences into...

The standard extensive-form partitional representation of information in sequential games fails to distinguish the description of the rules of interaction from the description of players' personal traits. Indeed, such representation does not model how the information given to players as per the...

This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if for any ε 0, any version of the game where players make mistakes with small enough probability has a perfect ε-equilibrium with outcome close to ω. Unlike stable...

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these...

Should a challenger face rivals simultaneously or sequentially? If sequentially, should he face weak or strong rivals first? To address these questions, we study signaling in dynamic contests, where a privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals. Against heterogenous opponents, the...

Partisan Gerrymandering is the self-interested manipulation of electoral boarder districts and is often criticised for leading to a misrepresentation of voter preferences. I use a dynamic contest model to show that such misrepresentation does not occur in a sequential Gerrymandering process. In...

This paper provides a fully fledged equilibrium analysis for two-player sequential-move contests with complete information, while allowing for a full spectrum of the contest's accuracy and players' asymmetry. For a strong-lead contest, an interior equilibrium (both players are active) prevails...

A central aspect of strategic reasoning in sequential games consists in anticipating how co-players would react to information about past play, which in turn depends on how co-players update and revise their beliefs. Several notions of belief system have been used to model how players’ beliefs...

We extend the war of attrition by studying a three-period dynamic contest game. In our game, players can fight against their opponents at certain period of the contest and can flee at any time. Waiting is costly. We focus on the role of waiting costs and show that the value of waiting costs is a...

The ultimatum heuristic is a decision-making tendency discernible in graphical plots of mixed-motive noncooperative games. As such, it can serve also as a solution approach, backsolving, predicting and explaining outcomes better than the mainstay Nash equilibrium concept whenever data for the...

We propose a concept of quantum extensive-form games, which is a quantum extension of classical extensive-form games. Extensive-form games is a general concept of games such as Go, Shogi, and chess, which have triggered the recent AI revolution, and is the basis for many important game theoretic...

We investigate a process of decision-making in a multi-period winner-take-all contest, in which competing players simultaneously choose among actions with different levels of risk every period. Strategic risk-taking is analyzed in isolation from effort choices, and, according to expected utility...

In a tournament, agents form coalitions, and the coalition with largest power wins the tournament. We introduce a new solution concept for the tournaments, called no threat equilibrium (NTE). NTE is a partition of the agents, where prudent and farsighted agents have no incentive to deviate....

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case---voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome---would be valid to imply long voting in our...

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments...

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective...

We investigate if, and why, an initial success can trigger a string of successes. Using random variations in success in a real‐effort laboratory experiment, we cleanly identify the causal effect of an early success in a competition. We confirm that an early success indeed leads to increased...

This paper uses a beauty contest game to test the gender differences in strategic reasoning. I conducted two experiments in China: one in a classroom setting with student subjects and the other online with the general population. In the first experiment, I found evidence of gender differences in...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon’s model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant’s prizes only depend on this contestant’s own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...

We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...

An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonus or promotion. The incumbent’s ability is commonly known, while that of the new hire is private information. The incumbent is subject to a perceptional bias: His prior about the new hire’s type differs from the true underlying...

We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...