Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) - a range of methods to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere- are a crucial innovation in meeting temperature targets set by international climate agreements. However, mechanisms which undo the adverse consequences of short-sighted actions (as NETs)...

We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other...

Cap-and-trade regulation is a strategy to reduce carbon emissions (CEs). During production, CEs are reduced by green technology. In a dual-channel supply chain (DCSC), customers try a product at an offline store but purchase it online (showrooming effect). Additionally, using internet...

We analyse the availability of source data of experimental data in a sample of highly respected economic journals. We test whether publication strategies of journals have an effect for the publication of data. The results for the sample of journals we investigated indicate a large variety of...

GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar...

We study large-population repeated games where players are symmetric but not anonymous, so player-specific rewards and punishments are feasible. Players may be commitment types who always take the same action. Even though players are not anonymous, we show that an anti-folk theorem holds when...

We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that...

While studies on individual-based and collective payment schemes are largely unconnected, there appears to be a widely held belief that individual-based schemes have a stronger influence on firm performance than collective ones. This also applies to an index of best management practices...

While studies on individual-based and collective payment schemes are largely unconnected, there appears to be a widely held belief that individual-based schemes have a stronger influence on firm performance than collective ones. This also applies to an index of best management practices...

An effective way to foster cooperation is to monitor behaviour and sanction freeriding. Yet, previous studies have shown that cooperation quickly declines when sanctioning mechanisms are removed. We test if explicitly expressing trust in players' capability to maintain cooperation after the...

Two consistent findings from the experimentally literature on public good games are that cooperation declines over time and cooperation is lower in countries with weak institutions. These findings, however, are primarily based on experiments in Europe, North America and Asia. There is little...

We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the...

In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling...

Paying it forward" is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often "pay-it-forward" even in the face of free-rider risks, the theoretical basis for the evolution of this...

Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing incentives to team members, however, can be diffcult. According to received wisdom, declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output "diffuses". But why? And why and when does formally...

Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of...

This study investigates a free-rider problem caused by externalities inherent in global commons, industrial pollution, and the hidden social costs of everyday activities. Within the range of sovereignty and privacy protection, to transform the social dilemma into an easier-to-solve coordination...

Teams are increasingly popular decision-making and work units in firms. This paper uses a novel real effort experiment to show that (a) some teams in the workplace reduce their members’ private benefits to achieve a group optimum in a social dilemma and (b) such endogenous choices by...

In this study, we experimentally analyze public goods games with an interior provision point. The role of ideology is tested in two different environments in which the political affiliation of group members is manipulated. While in the first experiment, participants’ ideology was no salient,...

Teamwork has become increasingly important in modern organizations and the labor market. Yet little is known about the role of self-confidence in teamwork. In this paper, we present evidence from a laboratory experiment using a team effort task. Effort and ability are complements and there are...