The Taxation Game is a cooperative game played between a set of countries I = {1, . . . , n} admitting the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, "the firm" ) within their jurisdiction. The firm, when operating within the territory of a subgroup S ⊆ I of countries (a coalition) will...

We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no...

We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no...

"Solving The Price is Right is an in-depth exploration of the underlying probability theory of the popular television program that explores how biases and behavioral pitfalls limit our ability to successfully apply logic and math both on and off the show."

"The author considers the interaction of three national macrosystems (economic, legal, and social) within a national public metasystem, justifying and solving the problem of their balancedness using the concept of Berge equilibrium. This equilibrium mathematically expresses the Golden Rule of...

This innovative book models pollution mitigation as a negative externality whilst also providing desirable and useful solutions, such as establishing the triangular equivalence relationship among the Lindahl equilibrium without transfers, the Nash bargaining solution with the payoffs of the...

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a...

In the U.S. Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a...

In the U.S. Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a...

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first...

Following the British decision to leave the European Union, the question arises as to how relations should be conducted going forward. The objective of the negotiations between Great Britain and the EU is to ensure which strategy is best - both for the British and the EU. Another important...

Verbraucherschützer fordern häufig mehr Regulierungen, strengere Kontrollen und härtere Strafen bei Verstößen gegen die Verbraucherrechte. Doch sind Anbieter tatsächlich nur auf ihren Eigennutz bedacht und nutzen jede Möglichkeit der Selbstbereicherung aus? Anlässlich des...

I Introduction -- II From Reproduction To Evolution (1 Reproduction as Basic Perspective of Political Economy 2 Reproduction of What? 3 Subjects and Needs as Ontological Concept 4 Selection, Adaptation, and Innovation in Evolutionary Process 5 Evolutionary Rationality?)Appendix: Fisher's Theorem...

Information asymmetry has been a critical issue in management accounting. Non-co-linearity of interests among market participants brings forth this problem. As a decision making tool, firms should leverage out the benefits of management accounting system to encounter this problem, as it has a...

We develop a quantitative theory of business cycles with coordination failures. Because of demand complementarities, firms seek to coordinate production and multiple equilibria arise. We use a global game approach to discipline equilibrium selection and show that the unique equilibrium exhibits...

Sharing a damage that has been caused by several individuals is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there exist basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them (like for instance in the third Restatement of Torts promulgated in May 1999), legal scholars are still...

In this paper, we propose a novel algorithmic approach to solve line planning problems. To this end, we model the line planning problem as a game where the passengers are players which aim at minimizing individual objective functions composed of travel time, transfer penalties, and a share of...

In this paper, we discuss how to determine the optimal investment portfolio and reinsurance strategy of insurance company based on zero-sum stochastic differential game between the market and the insurer. We extend Zhang and Siu (2009)’s model by (1) including a risk-free asset, (2)...

Game theory in economics -- Normal and extensive form games -- A first look at equilibrium -- Games with nature -- Nash equilibrium: existence and foundations -- Renements in dynamic games -- Signaling -- Repeated games -- Topics in dynamic games -- Bargaining -- Introduction to mechanism design...

We consider various lexicographic allocation procedures for coalitional games with transferable utility where the payoffs are computed in an externally given order of the players. The common feature of the methods is that if the allocation is in the core, it is an extreme point of the core. We...

This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria...

This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria...

We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a...