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Year of publication
Subject
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implementation theory 32 Implementation theory 31 incomplete contracts 22 Theorie 17 Spieltheorie 15 Game theory 14 Neue politische Ökonomie 14 experiments 14 Nash equilibrium 13 Public choice 13 Theory 13 Implementation Theory 12 Nash-Gleichgewicht 12 Mechanism design 10 Unvollständiger Vertrag 9 Experiment 8 incentive contracts 8 Incomplete contract 7 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 7 constitutions 7 ethical norms 7 framing 7 motivational crowding out 7 Experiments 6 Implementierungstheorie 6 Incomplete Contracts 6 Social preferences 6 Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion 6 Unvollkommene Information 5 game theory 5 mechanism design 5 Incomplete information 4 Social welfare function 4 Asymmetric information 3 Asymmetrische Information 3 Begrenzte Rationalität 3 Behavioral economics 3 Bounded rationality 3 Condorcet consistency 3 Market mechanism 3
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Online availability
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Free 48 Undetermined 15
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 49 Article 24 Other 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 21 Article in journal 15 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 15 Graue Literatur 11 Non-commercial literature 11 Arbeitspapier 10 Article 1 Collection of articles of several authors 1 Collection of articles written by one author 1 Hochschulschrift 1 Sammelwerk 1 Sammlung 1 Thesis 1
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Language
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English 50 Undetermined 23 Hungarian 1 Spanish 1
Author
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Fehr, Ernst 20 Wilkening, Tom 20 Powell, Michael 11 Aghion, Philippe 9 Bowles, Samuel 8 Amorós, Pablo 6 Holden, Richard 6 Hwang, Sung-Ha 5 Lombardi, Michele 5 Korpela, Ville 4 Moreno, Bernardo 4 Edelman, Paul H. 3 Holden, Richard T. 3 Martínez, Ricardo 3 Weymark, John A. 3 Wood, Peter John 3 Wu, Haoyang 3 Adachi, Tsuyoshi 2 Archer, Aaron 2 Kleinberg, Robert 2 Ponti, Giovanni 2 Puy, M. Socorro 2 Serrano, Roberto 2 Zachariassen, Julius 2 AmorÕs, Pablo 1 Cabrales, Antonio 1 Currie, Graham 1 Cárdenas, Ernesto 1 Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün 1 De Gruyter, Chris 1 Di Giannatale, Sonia 1 Elbittar, A. Alexander 1 Elbittar, Alexander 1 Gopalakrishnan, Sanjith 1 Hahmeier, Mark 1 Hwang, Sung Ha 1 Kagel, John H. 1 Ko, Chiu Yu 1 Konishi, Hideo 1 Miller, Stephen M. 1
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Institution
All
Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University 3 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 3 CESifo 2 Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia 2 Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst 2 Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, Facoltà di Economia "Richard M. Goodwin" 2 Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät 2 Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 2 Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) 2 Banca d'Italia 1 Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 1 Department of Economics, Boston College 1 Department of Economics, University of Nevada-Las Vegas 1 Econometric Society 1 School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study 1
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Published in...
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Working Paper 6 IZA Discussion Papers 4 Games and economic behavior 3 MPRA Paper 3 Social choice and welfare 3 Working paper series / University of Zurich, Department of Economics 3 CESifo Working Paper 2 CESifo Working Paper Series 2 CESifo working papers 2 Department of Economics University of Siena 2 Discussion paper 2 Discussion paper series / IZA 2 ECON - Working Papers 2 Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces 2 Games and Economic Behavior 2 UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2 Working Papers. Serie AD 2 Working paper / Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University 2 AEA papers and proceedings 1 Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1 CCEP Working Papers 1 Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 1 Economic theory 1 Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 1 Economics Working Papers / School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study 1 Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 1 Handbook of game theory with economic applications : volume 3 1 International economic review 1 Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1 Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 1 Journal of economic theory 1 Journal of mathematical economics 1 Production and operations management : the flagship research journal of the Production and Operations Management Society 1 Research Reports / Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University 1 Review of Economic Design 1 Revista de Economía Institucional 1 SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 SERIEs / Asociación Española de Economía - AEE 1 Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1 The Japanese economic review : the journal of the Japanese Economic Association 1
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Source
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RePEc 33 ECONIS (ZBW) 27 EconStor 12 BASE 3
Showing 1 - 50 of 75
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Behavioral implementation without unanimity
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Zachariassen, Julius - 2024
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...
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Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach
Āzacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - In: International economic review 65 (2024) 4, pp. 1821-1850
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Behavioral implementation without unanimity
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Zachariassen, Julius - 2024
Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014465032
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Cooperative security against interdependent risks
Gopalakrishnan, Sanjith; Sankaranarayanan, Sriram - In: Production and operations management : the flagship … 32 (2023) 11, pp. 3504-3520
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Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
Lombardi, Michele; Savva, Foivos; Zivanas, Nikolas - In: Social choice and welfare 60 (2023) 3, pp. 503-515
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Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
Narayanan, Aroon - In: Social choice and welfare 60 (2023) 4, pp. 561-578
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012373280
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Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2020 - Revised version
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012318860
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Efficient full implementation via transfers : uniqueness and sensitivity in symmetric environments
Ollár, Mariann; Penta, Antonio - In: AEA papers and proceedings 112 (2022), pp. 438-443
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Bidding against a buyout : implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
Sun, Chaoran - In: Journal of mathematical economics 101 (2022), pp. 1-12
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Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011925754
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Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - In: Economic theory 72 (2021) 4, pp. 1091-1120
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Dominant strategy implementability, zero length cycles, and affine maximizers
Edelman, Paul H.; Weymark, John A. - 2017
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Weak implementation
Pram, Kym - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 69 (2020) 3, pp. 523-568
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Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Journal of economic theory 185 (2020), pp. 1-19
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Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 108-116
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: An empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011282523
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - CESifo - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011257671
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011265296
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation
Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011220298
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010506318
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010510004
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Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
Shoukry, George F. N. - In: Social choice and welfare 52 (2019) 3, pp. 497-526
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012037835
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010398359
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010398533
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Handing out guns at a knife fight: Behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off- equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011282506
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - CESifo - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010889984
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Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms – which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010891173
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Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010886157
Saved in:
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Handing out guns at a knife fight : behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010398756
Saved in:
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Handing out guns at a knife fight : behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - 2014
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010399065
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Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional
Amorós, Pablo; Martínez, Ricardo; Moreno, Bernardo; … - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 1-14
A high court has to decide whether a lawis constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010317080
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"Neither I nor you shall have him" : an experimental study of the King Solomon's Dilemma
Elbittar, Alexander; Di Giannatale, Sonia - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 70 (2017), pp. 55-69
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011825382
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Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules
Wu, Haoyang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Quantum strategies have been successfully applied in game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, we generalize the classical theory of mechanism design to a quantum domain and obtain two results: 1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008529269
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Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle
Wu, Haoyang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the revelation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are serious bugs hidden in their proofs.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008531910
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Climate Change and Game Theory
Wood, Peter John - Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National … - 2010
This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008574080
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Two examples to break through classical theorems on Nash implementation with two agents
Wu, Haoyang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
[E. Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38] is a seminal paper in the field of mechanism design and implementation theory. [J. Moore and R. Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [B. Dutta and A. Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008595611
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Deciding Whether a Law is Constitutional, Interpretable, or Unconstitutional
Amorós, Pablo; Martínez, Ricardo; Moreno, Bernardo; … - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2010
A high court has to decide whether a law is constitutional, un- constitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008691150
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Climate Change and Game Theory
Wood, Peter John - Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National … - 2010
This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008693240
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Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker
Konishi, Hideo; Ko, Chiu Yu - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2009
This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso-Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firms' reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008461353
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Enhancing the impact of travel plans for new residential developments: Insights from implementation theory
De Gruyter, Chris; Rose, Geoffrey; Currie, Graham - In: Transport Policy 40 (2015) C, pp. 24-35
Travel plans are increasingly being required for new and expanded buildings as a condition of planning approval. Their aim is to manage car use and support access by more sustainable transport modes. However, their application to new residential developments has received little research...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011264506
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The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation : an empirical investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard T.; … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010502711
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Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2008
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009467887
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Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2008
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009468014
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Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung-Ha - 2008
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010287863
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Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Bowles, Samuel; Hwang, Sung Ha - Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst - 2008
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005018010
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Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
Archer, Aaron; Kleinberg, Robert - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 340-366
We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010785197
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A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
Adachi, Tsuyoshi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 508-518
We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de, ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010931204
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