I study how the distribution of environmental goods and income affect the economic valuation of local public goods. I find that how environmental inequality affects societal willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental local public goods is determined by their substitutability as well as by how...

I study how the distribution of environmental goods and income affect the economic valuation of local public goods. I find that how environmental inequality affects societal willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental local public goods is determined by their substitutability as well as by how...

We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot...

We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot...

The Henry George Theorem, which is originally established in a static model, asserts that the cost of public good provision should be equal to the total revenue of the land rent to achieve the optimal size of population of each region. This paper examines this theorem in a dynamic framework of...

This paper examines how citizens decide on their reservation utilities (expectations), in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. If all individuals have identical incomes, then political competition amongst citizens, to attract resources from the government brings reservation...

Multiple group memberships are the rule rather than the exception. Within a linear public good game, we experimentally investigate two possible factors that impact the decision to cooperate in a smaller, local or a larger, global group: diverging marginal per capita returns, resulting in...

Allocation of local public good over three jurisdictions with individuals with heterogeneous tastes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The nature of electoral uncertainty, the expectations of individuals from government captured by their reservation utilities, and...

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static...

This paper examines allocation of local public goods over jurisdictions (villages) with individuals with identical tastes and different incomes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The median voter (in income) in each jurisdiction determines the probability of re-election...

This paper examines allocation of local public goods over jurisdictions (villages) with individuals with identical tastes and different incomes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The median voter (in income) in each jurisdiction determines the probability of re-election...

The standard theory of anti - poverty targeting assumes individual incomes cannot be observed, but statistical properties of income distribution in broadly defined groups are known. "Indicator targeting" rules are then derived for the forms of transfers conditioned on group membership of...

The standard theory of anti-poverty targeting assumes individual incomes cannot be observed, but statistical properties of income distribution in broadly defined groups are known. Targeting rules are then derived for the forms of transfers conditioned on group membership of individuals. In this...

We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a...