Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Carbon leakage is one of the major issues facing policymakers today when designing environmental regulation. While the empirical and trade literature on carbon leakage is rich, much less is known about the implications of carbon leakage risk on optimal regulatory policies under asymmetric...

I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I...

We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends on whether the agent's (verifiable) presentation of...

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus,...

Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

A principal allocates a single good to one of several agents whose values are privately and independently distributed, employing an optimal mechanism. The principal shapes the distribution of the agents' values within general classes of constraints. Divisive product designs, which are either...

We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

Heterogeneous interconnections, which link regulated electricity markets to liberalised ones, are becoming increasingly important. Several such interconnections are set to be established in the near future especially between European and North African countries (e.g., Tunisia-Italy,...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...

Nowadays, rating systems play a crucial role in the attraction of customers to different services. However, as it is difficult to detect a fake rating, fraudulent users can potentially unfairly impact the rating's aggregated score. This fraudulent behavior can negatively affect customers and...

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

This paper investigates the optimal design of incentives when agents distort probabilities. We show that the type of probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented, the strength of the incentives included in the...

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...

Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection....

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

We study a mechanism that gives students the option of paying higher tuition to attend their preferred schools. This seat‐purchasing mechanism is neither strategyproof nor stable. Our paper combines administrative and survey data to estimate students' preferences and conducts welfare analysis....