The publication of nearly 600,000 new species occurrence maps using Global Biodiversity Information Facility data provides an opportunity to reassess international species protection with broader representation for plants, invertebrates, and other species. This development aligns with the global...

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed...

GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar...

This paper examines the definition and continuity of expected payoffs in compact games with continuous payoff functions. There are three main results. First, we confirm that Glicksberg's (1952) original definition of expected payoffs as an iterated integral is mathematically sound under general...

We study experimentally a new model to study the effect of climate externalities and contractual incompleteness on network formation. We model a network where good/green firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad/brown firms benefit from having a connection with...

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by...

We consider ergodic symmetric N-player and mean-field games of singular control in both cooperative and competitive settings. The state process dynamics of a representative player follow geometric Brownian motion, controlled additively through a nondecreasing process. Agents aim to maximize a...

I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information...

We start from the fundamental premise that any physical interaction can be interpreted as a game. To demonstrate this, we draw upon the free energy principle and the theory of quantum reference frames. In this way, we place the game-theoretic Nash Equilibrium in a new light in so far as the...

A number of learning models have been suggested to analyze the repeated interaction of boundedly rational agents competing in oligopolistic markets. The agents form a model of the environment that they are competing in, which includes the market demand and price formation process, as well as...