We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We trace the origins of the definition of the "quality variable" used in the theory of product differentiation, which states that quality is unanimously appreciated by consumers, entails a higher unit cost for firms, is unidimensional and continuous. We also document the transition from a...

Production functions provide a mapping from the firms' input quantity and productivity to output quantity. This mapping only generates unbiased estimates if input and output quality variation within and between observation units is accounted for. I review and classify state-of-the-art methods to...

We model competition on a credence market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the underlying quality ranking's precision by releasing individual...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We study information design in a vertically differentiated market. Two firms offer products of ex-ante unknown qualities. A third party designs a system to publicly disclose information. More precise information guides consumers toward their preferred product but increases expected product...

This paper studies biased-manager hiring in a market with network externalities and product compatibility. We show that the aggressivity of a biased manager has a non-linear relationship with product compatibility; however, since both owners want to hire aggressive managers, product...

The rising prevalence of greenwashing by firms has emerged as a major concern for regulatory authorities over the past decade. This paper examines the impact of regulation on firms' strategic decisions regarding greenwashing and environmental quality in an oligopolistic market. We model two...

This paper investigates the impact of services sector liberalization on product innovation of downstream manufacturing firms. Leveraging firm-product panel data from India and employing a shift-share research design, I find that services liberalization significantly increases firms’ product...

This paper provides a simple unified discrete-choice framework for analyzing differentiated duopolies. This framework nests models of horizontal and vertical differentiation, including standard textbook models (Hotelling and Shaked-Sutton). Contrary to these models, it also applies to economic...

How do environmental information and awareness interact to improve environmental quality by changing consumer behavior and firm strategies? This article provides theoretical insights using an original differentiation model within a general framework whose specific cases have been studied...

We experimentally investigate exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. In theory, when upstream firms make exclusive offers to a downstream monopolist, both exclusion and non-exclusion can be equilibrium outcomes. By varying key parameters, we explore how bargaining power...

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Differentiated goods and industry -- Chapter 3. Horizontal product differentiation -- Chapter 4. Vertical product differentiation -- Chapter 5. Network effects and product differentiation -- Chapter 6. Nesting horizontal and vertical differentiation --...

The default assumption of standard economics is to treat preferences as exogenously ‘given’, consistent with one another, ‘revealed’ by past choices, and context independent. There has been increased interest recently (within behavioural economics) in the impact of inconsistent or...

I analyze the implication of consumers' limited attention to quality differences on market outcomes and welfare. I model this limited attention to quality differences with a perception threshold: Consumers only perceive quality differences between goods that exceed the consumers' perception...

In this paper, unlike the conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that the relationship between the size of the market and number of firms would be non-monotonic. While moderate rise in the size would force the local firms to exit and only the foreign firm rules, substantial rise in the size would...

Especially in many online markets, consumers can readily observe prices, but may need to further inspect products to assess their suitability. We study the effects of product differentiation and search costs on competition and market outcomes in a tractable model of price-directed consumer...