The Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) frequently produces Pareto inefficient allocations in school choice problems. While a number of efficient mechanisms that Pareto-dominate DA are available, a normative question remains unexplored: which students should benefit from efficiency enhancements?...

Over sixty years following Brown vs. Board of Education, racial and socioeconomic segregation and lack of equal access to educational opportunities persist. Across the country, voluntary desegregation busing programs aim to ameliorate these imbalances and disparities. A longstanding...

Though the use of tracking policies to stratify students is commonplace, evi- dence concerning the effects of ability-based tracking on student performance is mixed. Using rich data from the Hungarian secondary school centralized assignment mechanism and a quasi-experimental framework, we find...

We partner with Ecuador's government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families' preferences. Results show that...

4207 In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non-truth-telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance...

Geographic school admissions criteria bind residential and school choices for some parents, and could create externalities in equilibrium for non-parents through displacement or higher rent. Through a dynamic structural model, we show that the policy decision of geographic versus non-geographic...

This study examines the impact of school choice on academic achievement. I use differences in the number of schools across similar Romanian towns, generating variation in school choice for local students, who compete for seats via test scores. I find that more school choice results in increased...

Using a rich dataset that merges student-level school records with birth records, and leveraging three alternative identification strategies, we explore how increase in access to charter schools in twelve districts in Florida affects students remaining in traditional public schools (TPS). We...

Many cities with school choice programs employ algorithms to determine which applicants get seats in oversubscribed schools. This study explores whether the New Orleans placement algorithm favored students of certain races or socioeconomic classes via its use of priorities such as geographic and...

This study examines the impact of school choice on academic achievement. I use differences in the number of schools across similar Romanian towns, generating variation in school choice for local students, who compete for seats via test scores. I find that more school choice results in increased...

This paper studies school choice and information frictions in Haiti. Through a randomized control trial, we assess the impact of disclosing school-level test score information on learning outcomes, prices, and market shares. We find evidence that in markets where information was disclosed,...

Understanding parental response to non-test score attributes is crucial to design effective school choice systems. We study an intervention providing hard-to-find information on the school environment at local institutions, while holding information on school performance constant. Outflow to...

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures...

Due to an unprecedented rise in demand, in 2020 the Peruvian Ministry of Education implemented a centralized assignment mechanism that allowed thousands of students at various levels of education to move from the private to the public sector. In this paper, we empirically explore the...

In this paper, we aim to understand some of the mechanisms behind the low impact of a Chilean educational reform on socioeconomic integration within the school system. We focus on pre-kindergarden (pre-K) admissions, which account for the highest volume of applications since all students (except...

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate...

Understanding parental response to non-test score attributes is crucial to design effective school choice systems. We study an intervention providing parents with hard-to-find information on the school environment while holding information on school performance constant. The provision of this...

This paper studies the consequences of the buildup of a new economic sector-the Norwegian petroleum industry-on investment in human capital. We assess both short-term and long-term effects for a broad set of educational margins, by comparing individuals in regions exposed to the new sector with...

This paper studies an information intervention designed and implemented in the context of a school assignment mechanism in Mexico City. We find that providing students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds with feedback about their academic performance contributes to placing...

We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures...

We investigate whether classical studies in high school - that emphasize in Italy the study of ancient languages such as Latin and Greek - affect personality traits. Using Italian survey data, we compare individuals who did classical studies in high school with similar individuals who completed...

We investigate whether classical studies in high school - that emphasize in Italy the study of ancient languages such as Latin and Greek - affect personality traits. Using Italian survey data, we compare individuals who did classical studies in high school with similar individuals who completed...

This paper studies school choice and information in the context of education markets in rural Haiti. Using a market level randomized control trial, we evaluate the aggregate effect of providing test score information on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment. After the intervention, we...

The Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) frequently produces Pareto inefficient allocations in school choice problems. While a number of efficient mechanisms that Pareto-dominate DA are available, a normative question remains unexplored: which students should benefit from efficiency enhancements?...

How should students be assigned to schools? Two mechanisms have been suggested and implemented around the world: deferred acceptance (DA) and top trading cycles (TTC). These two mechanisms are widely considered excellent choices because they are strategy-proof, in addition to DA's no justified...

This paper studies the limits of school choice policies in the presence of residential segregation. Using data from the Boston Public Schools choice system, I show that white prekindergarteners are assigned to higher-achieving schools than minority students, and that cross-race school...

Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide...

We examine the effect of attending academically selective high schools on test scores, by leveraging administrative data that matches high school preferences of the population of urban middle school graduates in one Chinese prefecture in 2010 with high school student records. The standard...