I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information...

We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...

This paper explores how the persistence of past choices creates incentives in a continuous time stochastic game involving a large player (e.g., a firm) and a sequence of small players (e.g., customers). The large player faces moral hazard and her actions are distorted by a Brownian motion....

We formulate and study a two-player duel game as a terminal payoffs stochastic game. Players 𝑃1,𝑃2 are standing in place and, in every turn, each may shoot at the other (in other words, abstention is allowed). If 𝑃𝑛 shoots 𝑃𝑚 (𝑚≠𝑛), either they hit and kill them (with...

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is quadratic in the state and linear in the control. We call...

This paper investigates the optimal asset-liability management problems for two managers subject to relative performance concerns in the presence of stochastic inflation and stochastic volatility. The objective of the two managers is to maximize the expected utility of their relative terminal...

This paper presents the existence and uniqueness results (in the sense of maximally defined regularity) as well as the stability analysis for the solutions to a class of nonlocal fully-nonlinear parabolic systems, where the nonlocality stems from the flow feature (controlled by an external...

We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the N-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order arrivals thereby generating an additional transient price...