We continue the discussion of the taxation game following our presentation in [12]. Our concept describes a cooperative game played between a set of jurisdictions (" countries"). These players admit the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, the "firm") within their jurisdiction. The...

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining wellspecified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit nontrivial efficient...

This paper proposes empirically tractable multidimensional matching models, focusing on worker-job matching. We generalize the parametric model proposed by Lindenlaub (2017), which relies on the assumption of joint normality of observed characteristics of workers and jobs. In our paper, we allow...

We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize...

This paper proposes empirically tractable multidimensional matching models, focusing on worker-job matching. We generalize the parametric model proposed by Lindenlaub (2017), which relies on the assumption of joint normality of observed characteristics of workers and jobs. In our paper, we allow...

The Taxation Game is a cooperative game played between a set of countries I = {1, . . . , n} admitting the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, "the firm" ) within their jurisdiction. The firm, when operating within the territory of a subgroup S ⊆ I of countries (a coalition) will...

Each value for TU-games satisfying efficiency, symmetric and linear is called an ESL value. We introduce a new value for TU-games with coalition structures, namely the Shapley-ESL value, which applies the Shapley value among coalitions and the ESL value within coalitions. Based on a new basis...

In this paper, we introduce a new class of values for cooperative games, named procedural surplus values, which is determined by procedures of sharing marginal surplus. Considering that the level of solidarity among players in a coalition may be related to the size of the coalition, this class...

We discuss the failure of the non-levelness of the bargaining set in bargaining problems appearing in a series of papers that study bargaining over quantity produced between a firm and a labor union. The associated bargaining does not feature transferable utilities and the disagreement point is...

A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of...

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead of a real number. This study revisits two interval game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley...

In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. We use the framework of a Shapley allocation which is regarded as a fundamental method of...

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty as represented by a closed interval. In this study, we examine two interval-game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley value and the interval Shapley-like...

This paper provides an extension of the Nash solution to NTU bargaining and rationing problems, allowing for non-convex, non-smooth utility possibility sets. We do so by interpreting the Nash solution as the maximiser of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, in which the weights are...

This paper proposes a simple solution to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem in Choo and Siow (2006) model, overcoming what is probably the main limitation of this approach. The solution consists of assuming match-specific rather than choice-specific random preferences. The...