This paper characterizes profit shifting behavior across the size distribution of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to evaluate the targeting of the recently introduced Global Minimum Tax (GMT). Using German microeconomic administrative data with no reporting gaps for tax havens, we first...

To combat firms exploiting transfer pricing as a tool for tax avoidance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action 13 (BEPS 13), enhancing tax transparency and the exchange of information with tax authorities....

We investigate how tax authorities use joint tax audits as a coordinated enforcement tool in cross-border transactions of a multinational firm. Joint tax audits aim to resolve potential tax disputes early, before such disputes escalate into costly and time-consuming resolution procedures that...

We provide estimates of profit shifting for over 2 million firm-year observations in 100 countries over the period 2009-2020. Employing nonparametric estimation techniques within a mainstay model of profit shifting, we examine how the profits of both parent and subsidiary firms within a...

Tax havens represent the largest financing hub for financial institutions. For banks, they account for more than 20% of all cross-borders banking debt worldwide. Yet, our understanding of the underlying drivers remains limited. Drawing on a unique global dataset covering major international...

This paper presents a comparative empirical analysis of multinational profit shifting using two principal data sources: the OECD Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) statistics and ORBIS firm-level financial data. We begin by systematically examining structural and reporting differences across...

Using exhaustive microdata on the worldwide activity of multinational firms from Country-by-Country Reports linked to employer-employee data, we study how profit shifting affects workers' earnings. We estimate that large French multinationals shift 19% of their foreign profits annually to...

We assess the welfare implications of the Global Minimum Tax (GMT) on corporate income in a multi-country macroeconomic model. The objectives of the GMT are to mitigate harmful tax competition and to curb wasteful profit shifting. The theoretical literature suggests that the welfare effects of...

By focusing exclusively on large multinational groups, the global minimum tax (GMT) aims to target most of the world's profit shifting while keeping aggregate compliance costs at an acceptable level. This policy brief presents new evidence on profit shifting behavior across the size distribution...

In this paper we theoretically analyse the European Union's ongoing political impasse regarding the choice of a single method to allocate multinational enterprises' profits across countries and we find that this strategic situation resembles a coordination game with distributional consequences....

This paper analyzes how (local) tax havens function. Using the German municipal business tax setting as a laboratory, I investigate the characteristics and emergence of local tax havens. I demonstrate that local tax havens are situated in close proximity to large agglomeration areas, while...

By focusing exclusively on large multinational groups, the global minimum tax (GMT) aims to target most of the world's profit shifting while keeping aggregate compliance costs at an acceptable level. This policy brief presents new evidence on profit shifting behavior across the size distribution...

This chapter reviews the literature providing empirical estimates on the tax elasticity of multinational profits and discusses the challenges faced when attempting to quantify tax-motivated profit shifting. We first use micro-level data to show that multinational corporations hold a...

Taxation of cross-border services has been identified as a high priority issue in the United Nations (UN) negotiations to establish a new global framework for tax. This paper analyses the defects of international tax rules as applied to services, and their exploitation by multinational...

Multinational enterprises are increasingly using offshore locations to pay lower taxes on their profits. This behavior has distortive effects on the global economy, as the concentration of multinational activities mirrors global tax patterns. In this paper, I exploit the OECD country-by-country...

Many multinational firms (MNEs) pay low or no corporation tax in high-tax countries because they shift taxable income to tax havens. We incorporate nonconvex costs of profit shifting and unobserved heterogeneity in profit-shifting ability in the MNEs’ value maximization problem to study...

Since 2016, Country-by-Country reporting has provided tax authorities with detailed information about multinationals’ worldwide activities. It has been hailed as a game-changer for corporate taxation, enabling tax authorities to target multinational firms with high profits in tax havens. We...

Aggressive profit shifting by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is a growing concern for domestic resource mobilization in developing economies. This paper evaluates the revenue and welfare consequences of a flagship tax avoidance rule that has been implemented in more than 45 countries to...

We develop a methodology to decompose the tax revenue impact of the global minimum tax introduced in 2024 into several components and quantify its potential impact on profit shifting. We apply it to 34 thousand multinational-country observations from tax returns, financial statements and...

The Global Minimum Tax (GMT) is applied only to firms above a certain size threshold, permitting countries to set differential tax rates for small and large firms. We analyse tax competition between a tax haven and a non-haven country for heterogeneous multinationals to evaluate the effects of...

We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but...