I develop a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy to identify two key vulnerabilities that prevent emerging markets from fully integrating into global markets: high financial integration costs and their low position in the international monetary hierarchy. These vulnerabilities...

Firms organize their production processes differently, with consequences for various metrics of the economy. A so-far little explored issue is whether and how the deepness of firms, meaning the number of hierarchical levels, affects employment segregation in the labor market. We show how the...

In this article, we extend the application of cooperative game theory to the so-called low-risk puzzle. Specifically, we apply concepts that consider hierarchies on the assets in the allocation of portfolio risk. These hierarchies have not previously been considered in portfolio risk allocation...

Liberalisation and decarbonisation have transformed energy system coordination from internal engineering to a complex economic and digital challenge. Liberalisation replaced vertically integrated utilities with fragmented interactions among transmission operators, distribution operators,...

The impact of hierarchical differentiation on team effectiveness is heavily discussed in scientific research with strong argumentslined up on both the pro and the contra sides. To contribute to this debate, I investigated the relationship between a specificfacet of hierarchical differentiation,...

Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance:...

Cooperatives are seen as the bedrock of democratic control and an alternative to capitalist enterprises but also as sites of ‘degeneration’ of democratic values and hopes. In this article, the authors conceptualize that cooperatives are a prime example of a paradoxical organization, which...

We consider an organization with two projects which have productive spillovers. Three agents are active in this organization: two agents, each specialized in one project, and the CEO, who is a generalist. The organization owner first allocates authority over each project to these three...

Theories of political accountability typically focus on voter-politician relationships. However, overall government performance depends on both elected politicians and unelected bureaucrats. Politicians are agents of voters while serving as principals to bureaucrats. We develop a model of...

In this study, we explore the relation between job characteristics and employees' self-evaluations of performance in comparison to their colleagues' performance. Making use of unique individual panel data of ten large firms in Germany's chemical industry, we focus on monetary rewards (bonus...

This paper proposes a model of equilibrium switching in coordination games such as collective participation in social changes. In our model, players are forward-looking but use level-k reasoning about their peers' choices. We find that equilibrium switching is deterministic and gradual, with...

The reasons behind changes in assortative mating remain difficult to understand. Using the text from matrimonial ads, we assemble a novel dataset to describe the evolution of partner preferences over time and space. Analyzing ads published in Canada, France and India between 1950 and 1995, we...

Theories of political accountability often consider voter-politician interactions in isolation from politician-bureaucrat interactions. We study a model of electoral accountability with a governing hierarchy: voter-politician-bureaucrat. The politician and bureaucrat both produce government...

This paper proposes a new link relating export destinations and the organization of the firm. We claim that the production of higher-quality varieties exported to rich destinations induces firms to restructure their production processes, becoming organizationally more complex. We introduce a...

A large literature suggests that incentive pay and delegation of worker authority are positively related. Using data from a large cross section of British establishments, we show that the positive relationship found in the empirical literature masks a stark difference across jobs. Classifying...