Experiment participants in a social dilemma game choose cooperation over defection, even though neither is more beneficial. High levels of cooperation cannot be explained by favorable labels for actions, collusion, k-level reasoning, quantal response behavior, or misplaced optimism about others'...

In this article, we extend the application of cooperative game theory to the so-called low-risk puzzle. Specifically, we apply concepts that consider hierarchies on the assets in the allocation of portfolio risk. These hierarchies have not previously been considered in portfolio risk allocation...

We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and the group of decision-makers worse off than defection, but favors individuals outside the group. An example is climate change mitigation. In this context, we experimentally...

This paper studies how competition between groups affects cooperation. In the control condition, pairs of subjects play an indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game without external competition. In the treatment, two pairs compete against each other. No monetary rewards are tied to winning,...

We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining wellspecified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit nontrivial efficient...

Managing risk, matching resources efficiently, and ensuring fair allocation are fundamental challenges in both finance and decision-making processes. In many scenarios, participants contribute unequally to collective outcomes, raising the question of how to distribute costs, benefits, or...

We analyze infinitely repeated multiplayer prisoner's dilemmas in continuous-time experiments. As the number of players changes, our design keeps the payoffs of the all-defection, all-cooperation, and unilateral- defection and -cooperation outcomes constant, thus controlling for the minimum...

In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which...

When several participants, working together, gained some amount of money, what is the fair way to distribute this amount between them? This is the problem that the future Nobelist Lloyd Shapley was working on when he proposed what is now called the Shapley value - a division uniquely determined...

This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing...

We investigate the (a:b) Maker-Breaker subgraph game played on the edge set of the complete graph Kn, where n,a,b∈N, and Maker's objective is to construct a member of a prescribed family of graphs H, while Breaker aims to prevent this. In our study, Breaker moves first, and H is taken to be...

We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for...

In two-sided markets with money, core stability and marginalism are often in conflict. We reconcile them with two main results. First, we show that in the assignment game (Shapley & Shubik, 1972), the Banzhaf value is core stable if and only if the game is exact. This is surprising for two...

The Taxation Game is a cooperative game played between a set of countries I = {1, . . . , n} admitting the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, "the firm" ) within their jurisdiction. The firm, when operating within the territory of a subgroup S ⊆ I of countries (a coalition) will...

Two consistent findings from the experimentally literature on public good games are that cooperation declines over time and cooperation is lower in countries with weak institutions. These findings, however, are primarily based on experiments in Europe, North America and Asia. There is little...

This study explores the dynamics of international strategic learning alliances through the lens of game theory, incorporating complexity and cooperative game theories to develop a model of organizational evolution. Using simulations and network resources, we examine 1200 cases to assess the...