We study the problem of distributing subsidies in a market that includes both marginal individuals in need of assistance and infra-marginal individuals who would purchase the subsidized product without additional incentives. We propose the use of a wait time auction, where individuals bid the...

Heterogeneous interconnections, which link regulated electricity markets to liberalised ones, are becoming increasingly important. Several such interconnections are set to be established in the near future especially between European and North African countries (e.g., Tunisia-Italy,...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is becoming an emerging topic in climate policy. We review the nascent economic literature on the governance of CDR and discuss policy design and institutions. We first assess the role of CDR in climate policy portfolios that include abatement and adaptation. Cost...

We study a mechanism that gives students the option of paying higher tuition to attend their preferred schools. This seat‐purchasing mechanism is neither strategyproof nor stable. Our paper combines administrative and survey data to estimate students' preferences and conducts welfare analysis....

The design of the power market determines how the sector can address complex economic, social, environmental, and engineering challenges to deliver sustainable and reliable electricity at least cost to consumers. This is no simple task, as supply and demand must be balanced every second,...

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is becoming an emerging topic in climate policy. We review the nascent economic literature on the governance of CDR and discuss policy design and institutions. We first assess the role of CDR in climate policy portfolios that include abatement and adaptation. Cost...

We partner with Ecuador's government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families' preferences. Results show that...

With the final approval of the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), it is now clear that general-purpose AI (GPAI) models with systemic risk will need to undergo adversarial testing. This provision is a response to the emergence of "generative AI" models, which are currently the most...

This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction experiments. The first factor examines subjects' understanding of strategy-proofness (SP), while the second focuses on "human interaction" which includes social preferences (spite and...

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...