We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the...

GoBs are goods for which agents have non-monotonic preferences: more is beneficial only up to an ideal level, beyond which additional quantities become undesirable. We analyze public GoBs (non-excludable and non-rival) through a theoretical framework applicable to diverse contexts such as solar...

This paper examines the definition and continuity of expected payoffs in compact games with continuous payoff functions. There are three main results. First, we confirm that Glicksberg's (1952) original definition of expected payoffs as an iterated integral is mathematically sound under general...

We study experimentally a new model to study the effect of climate externalities and contractual incompleteness on network formation. We model a network where good/green firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad/brown firms benefit from having a connection with...

The publication of nearly 600,000 new species occurrence maps using Global Biodiversity Information Facility data provides an opportunity to reassess international species protection with broader representation for plants, invertebrates, and other species. This development aligns with the global...

We have built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating. Up to this time, games with network structure and continuous updating were considered separately. We analyzed...

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as...

In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which...

Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a standard model of commercial media bias,...

We analyse the conditions for a particular type of mixed strategy profile to be an equilibrium in a specific buy and sell strategic market game à la Shapley and Shubik (1977), with two goods, using best responses of a player against random bids by the other players. We first identify a...

In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those...

Hirshleifer's difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective...