This paper explores informality in a high income country among women who, at least legally, can take on formal jobs. Specifically, we examine the determinants of paid domestic work in Israel through the lens of existing theoretical frameworks of informality. Using rich administrative data, we...

In this study, we focus on managerial incentives provided by debt-like compensation and further investigate whether and to what extent such managerial incentives may affect CEOs' decisions on risk management. Building on cumulative prospect theory and instrumental stakeholder theory, we propose...

Casting mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982) implies that his generalized revelation principle directly applies, and we thus obtain standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends, however, on whether the presentation of...

In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China, we divide state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into four categories according to their equity structure, namely absolute holding firms, relative holding firms, major impact firms and equity...

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

Questions about market power have become salient in macroeconomics. We consider the role of institutional structures in addressing these within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Standard models account for monopoly profits as a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent. We label this...

Despite extensive literature on incentives to increase employees' work performance, economic research on employer-provided non-monetary benefits remains rare. This study investigates the relationship between benefits and employees' work effort utilizing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel....

We examine how a CEO develops a reputation for credible financial reporting and how this reputation influences investor reactions to earnings announcements. We find that investors discount earnings news when CEOs have both strong incentives to misreport and weak reporting reputations. Further,...

It is often assumed that family ownership, which consists of individuals who share a common history and values, is homogenous. However, family owners exhibit varied patterns of engagements toward ownership because of differences in their roles, goals, needs and expectations within the family and...

This research explores the impact of ownership structure on the financial performance of Leveraged Buyout (LBO) transactions in the MENA region, a key emerging market region. Drawing on agency theory by Jensen & Meckling and the capital structure theory of Modigliani and Miller, the study...

With growing public and policy-makers' attention to en vironmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures, a natural question is how management compensation systems should include ESG metrics. This paper selectively reviews and discusses insights from agency theory on the design of optimal...

We consider the contracting problem between a firm and a manager. The manager provides productive efforts to increase the firm's financial performance and to reduce its carbon emissions. The outcome of these efforts depends on the manager's 'green' ability. The manager is interested in the...

This supplement contains auxiliary technical results and proofs omitted from Bloedel, Krishna, and Leukhina (2025) (henceforth BKL) and its Supplemental Appendix (henceforth SA). First, Section I proves parts (a)–(c) and (e)–(f) of Theorem 3 from Appendix B.1 of BKL. (Part (d) of Theorem 3...

The issue of conflicting interests between company management and stakeholders arises when the management prioritizes its own compensation over the interests of other parties. This disparity in interests is commonly referred to as the agency problem. To address this problem, corporate governance...