Using a novel and unique panel dataset of individual-level professional forecasts at short, medium, and very-long horizons, we provide new stylized facts about survey forecasts. We present direct evidence that forecasters use multivariate models in an environment with imperfect information about...

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

Announcing a large fiscal stimulus may signal the government's pessimism about the severity of a recession to the private sector, impairing the stabilizing effects of the policy. Using a theoretical model, we show that these signaling effects occur when the stimulus exceeds expectations and are...

We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is...

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

Decision-makers sometimes rely on past data to learn statistical relationships between variables. However, when predicting a target variable, they must adjust how they aggregate past information depending on the observables available. If agents have information on all observables, it is optimal...

How does information transmission change when it requires attracting the attention of receivers? This paper combines an experiment that varies freelance professionals’ incentives to attract attention about scientific findings, with several online experiments that exogenously expose receivers...

This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's...

We test the predictions of the sticky information model using a survey dataset by comparing shoppers' accuracy in recalling the prices of regulated and comparable unregulated products. Because regulated product prices are capped, they are sold more than comparable unregulated products, while...

This work highlights a previously overlooked factor that contributes to bias in private inflation forecasts-ignorance of confidential monetary rules. Additionally, it examines how this ignorance indirectly affects policy rate settings. The model proposed reconciles biases in two key forecast...

We study a duel game in which each player has incomplete knowledge of the game parameters. We present a simple, heuristically motivated and easily implemented algorithm by which, in the course of repeated plays, each player estimates the missing parameters and consequently learns his optimal...

We show that the discrete real option game model proposed in the recent literature can be extended to the case of imperfect information. As a result, the model can cover a wider range of applications. However, we also observe that the effectiveness of implementing the subsidy is affected by the...

We develop a sequentially variant Blotto game with one-sided and incomplete information to investigate strategic interactions between a defender and an attacker whose target site values are unknown. The defender first allocates defensive resources before the attacker decides a probability...

Building on the sequential identification result of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019), this paper develops estimation and inference procedures for static games of incomplete information with payoff‐relevant unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria. With payoff‐relevant unobserved...

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Information provision experiments have become pivotal in understanding how beliefs influence human behavior in various social science contexts. These experiments, which manipulate the information sets available to respondents, enable the exogenous alteration of beliefs and perceived constraints,...