This paper analyzes the welfare effects of private and unilateral disclosure of sensitive information in a sequential bargaining context. We consider a model where two sellers each propose a take-it-or-leave-it price for a homogeneous good to a single buyer. The buyer accepts or rejects the...

We develop a tractable model of competitive price cycles where prices are chosen alternatingly and consumers have heterogenous information. The model yields sharp empirical predictions about price patterns, impact of captive consumers and pass-through. Using rich station-level price data from...

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices...

While an influential body of economic literature shows that allowing for communication between firms increases collusion in oligopolies, so far we have only anecdotal evidence on the precise communication content that helps firms to coordinate their behavior. In this paper, we conduct a...

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms from 2007 to 2020, we investigate the governance implications of cross-ownership in corporate bond markets. We find that cross-ownership significantly reduces bond issuance spreads, suggesting that synergistic governance effects outweigh potential collusion...

We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows a firm to be collusive when facing members of its cartel yet competitive when facing others. Intuitively, as initial bids are shaded, close initial bids not only imply similar costs but also provide an...

Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms engaging in illegal pricefixing. We examine how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand...

The regulatory shift by competition and antitrust authorities, allowing limited industry collusion in sustainability-related investments to align markets with broader environmental and social objectives, suggests a re-evaluation of competition as a mechanism for promoting collective welfare....

Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...

This paper explores algorithmic collusion from both legal and economic perspectives, underscoring the increasing influence of algorithms in firms’ market decisions and their potential to facilitate anti-competitive behaviour. By employing bandit algorithms as a model—typically used in...

We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit...

Purpose - Using Chinese A-share listed firms between 2007 and 2020 with 21,380 observations, we aim to examine the impact of cross-ownership on firms' innovation output and explore the underlying mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach - To test the influence of cross-ownership on firms'...

This paper investigates partial cartels, which laboratory studies have neglected despite their empirical prevalence. We conduct two laboratory experiments to understand how they function compared to all-inclusive cartels and respond to antitrust policies. First, we compare partial cartel...

This study constructs a model of exclusive-offer competition between two existing up-stream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival's exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is...

We experimentally investigate exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. In theory, when upstream firms make exclusive offers to a downstream monopolist, both exclusion and non-exclusion can be equilibrium outcomes. By varying key parameters, we explore how bargaining power...

Sellers face a critical choice: run competitive auctions or strike exclusive deals with preferred buyers. Contrary to conventional wisdom that sellers should rely on open competition, we show that a powerful seller optimally commits to a sequential `flexclusivity' arrangement - a strategic mix...

Geschäfte mit Nahestehenden: Eine grundsätzliche Lösung für das Außensteuer-, Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht - Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von BEPS Bericht 8 und des Wettbewerbsrechts Gliederung 1. Einleitung 2. Wesentliche Ergebnisse der Untersuchung 3. Zusammenfassung 1....

Following the judgment of the Court of Justice and especially the Opinion of the Advocate General in the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide case, arbitration agreements on disputes concerning damages for infringements of the competition rules of the TFEU have been interpreted as being contrary to the...

Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels’ failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the...

We rationalize exclusive portfolio dealing in a novel three-period partial equilibrium framework populated by a representative, risk-neutral seller and a small number of ex ante identical broker-dealers. Endowed with independent, uncertain demand for a representative asset, the broker-dealers...