Eficiencia en asignación de cuotas individuales de pesca: teorema de Coase y asimetrías de información
This paper shows that the initial allocation of individual fishing quotas through auctions guarantee economic efficiency. This result is not necessarily true when the assignment is made by historical criteria. The central argument is that the Coase theorem (even in its weak version) is inappropriate when there are information asymmetries, even with zero transaction costs. A direct application of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem states that the initial allocation of these fishing rights does matter, generating a bias in the final allocation favorable to whom has the initial property right. From the public policy point of view, it is essential to ensure an efficient allocation of the initial fishing quotas, which could only be guaranteed with a properly designed auction.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Eduardo, Saavedra ; Manuel, Willington |
Published in: |
Estudios Públicos. - Centro de Estudios Públicos. - 2012, 127, p. 54-87
|
Publisher: |
Centro de Estudios Públicos |
Subject: | fishing quotas | transaction | information | Coase | Myerson-Satterthwaite |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | text/html application/pdf |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law ; L78 - Government Policy ; Q22 - Fishery |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936686
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